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The economic model of individual behavior is predicated on the as-
sumption that people rationally choose among their opportunities to
achieve maximum satisfaction according to their individual preferences.'
In accordance with this model, if a person's opportunities or preferences
change, then the opportunity the person chooses to satisfy her prefer-
ences will also change. Thus the economic model suggests at least two
modes by which society can promote desired individual behavior: (1)
shaping the individual's opportunities to give incentive for desired behav-
ior, or (2) shaping the individual's preferences by increasing her taste for
desired behavior.
To date, law and economics scholars have primarily examined crim-
inal law as an opportunity-shaping policy. Beginning with the work of
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ANALYSIS 115 (2d ed. 1984). Throughout this Article I rely on Varian's books for cites on the basic
tenets of economic analysis. MICRoEcoNOMIC ANALYSIS is the standard resource for economic
theorists. INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS covers much the same material at a level that is more
approachable by novices in economics.
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Gary Becker,2 the role of criminal punishment has been largely limited to
reducing the attractiveness of criminal opportunities in order to induce
optimal compliance with criminal law.3 Although this analysis has
proven fruitful,4 law and economics scholars have recently expressed
misgivings about the adequacy of the current model.5 Critics contend
that the model has trouble explaining fundamental characteristics of
criminal law, including the importance of intent to criminal liability, the
relative lack of importance of actual harm to criminal liability, the treat-
ment of imprisonment and fines as incommensurate punishments, and
the variation of punishment based on the characteristics of individual
offenders.6 Perhaps the most troubling shortcoming of the current eco-
nomic model is its failure to yield a satisfactory distinction between crim-
inal and tort law.7 If tort law is designed to provide incentives for
efficient personal behavior as law and economics scholars have suggested,
then what explains the existence of the "criminal category"?"
In this Article I provide an economic analysis of criminal law as a
preference-shaping policy. I argue that in addition to creating disincen-
tives for criminal activity, criminal punishment is intended to promote
various social norms of individual behavior by shaping the preferences of
criminals and the population at large. By taking into account this prefer-
ence-shaping function, I explain many of the characteristics of criminal
2. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
Actually, as Becker acknowledged, his work was the modern rebirth and extension of the opportu-
nity shaping theory of criminal law developed by Bentham and Beccaria. Id. at 209.
3. Id. at 179, 191.
4. For useful surveys of the literature on the economic analysis of crime and criminal law, see
D. PYLE, THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (1983); ECONOMIC MODELS OF
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (J. Heineke ed. 1978); Cameron, The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Sur-
vey of Theory and Evidence, 41 KYKLOS 301 (1988).
5. Coleman, Crime, Kickers, and Transaction Structures, in NoMos XXVII: CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE 313 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1985); Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in id.
at 289, 290 [hereinafter Klevorick, Economic Theory of Crime]; Klevorick, Legal Theory and the
Economic Analysis of Torts and Crimes, 85 COLuM. L. REV. 905 (1985) [hereinafter Klevorick, Torts
and Crimes].
6. Coleman, supra note 5, at 324-25 (discussion of intent and punishment); Fletcher, A Trans-
action Theory of Crime?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 921, 924 (1985) (discussion of punishment); Rizzo,
Economic Costs, Moral Costs, or Retributive Justice: The Rationale of Criminal Law, in THE COSTS
OF CRIME 257, 259-69 (C. Gray ed. 1979) (discussion of all characteristics); Schulhofer, Is There an
Economic Theory of Crime?, in NoMos XXVII, supra note 5, at 329, 336-38 (discussion of intent
and punishment). The importance of intent and the almost irrelevance of actual harm to criminal
liability have been identified as the primary characteristics distinguishing criminal law from tort law.
Epstein, Crime and Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION,
RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 231, 248 (R. Barnett & . Hagel eds. 1977).
7. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 923-27; Klevorick, Economic Theory of Crime, supra note 5, at
295; Klevorick, Torts and Crimes, supra note 5, at 908; R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOM-
ICS 511-14 (1988).
8. Klevorick, Economic Theory of Crime, supra note 5, at 295-97.
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law that have heretofore escaped the logic of the economic model. It is
also the preference-shaping function and the prerequisite ordering of
preferences that distinguish criminal law from tort law. My analysis
suggests that society will make an activity a crime whenever the social
benefits of changing individual preferences through criminal punishment
outweigh the social costs. However, since this weighing of social costs
and benefits is conducted through a political process on the basis of ethi-
cal and moral standards and requires estimates of the costs of changing
opportunities and preferences, I conclude that other disciplines can use-
fully inform the economic model of criminal law.
This Article is organized in three parts. Part I sets forth the eco-
nomic theory of crime and its regulation through criminal law. It begins
by reviewing some basic concepts of economic analysis (subpart A) 9 and
the formulation of the problem of crime in the economic model (subpart
B). 10 I then present the economists' traditional opportunity-shaping so-
lution to the problem of crime (subpart C), I my analysis of the alterna-
tive, preference-shaping solution (subpart D),1 2 and a brief discussion of
the balancing of these two solutions in an optimal policy for the control
of crime (subpart E).13 Part II presents empirical support for my prefer-
ence-shaping analysis of criminal law by examining some characteristics
of criminal law that have proved troublesome for the current economic
model.14 Finally, Part III examines the distinction between tort and
criminal law in light of my analysis of criminal law as a preference-shap-
ing policy.15
I. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIME
A. Foundations of Economic Analysis
The basis of the economic model of individual behavior is the as-
sumption that people rationally choose among their opportunities to
achieve the greatest satisfaction of their preferences. Breaking this as-
sumption down into its component parts, economists view individual
choice as governed by two functions. The first is the "constraint" or
"opportunity set," which specifies the set of all feasible opportunities that
9. See supra text accompanying notes 16-37.
10. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
11. See supra text accompanying notes 42-72.
12. See supra text accompanying notes 73-100.
13. See supra text accompanying notes 101-10.
14. See supra text accompanying notes 114-59.
15. See supra text accompanying notes 160-95.
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an individual might choose.16 Economists commonly assume the indi-
vidual has perfect information on all these opportunities.' 7 The second
function is the "objective function," which specifies an individual's rank-
ing of her opportunities from least to most preferred. 18 Sometimes econ-
omists envision this ordering of opportunities according to the
satisfaction or utility each opportunity will bring the individual and refer
to it as the individual's "utility function."' 9 Economists assume that the
individual is rational in that her preferences are complete, reflexive, and
transitive, and the individual will choose the opportunity that yields the
greatest utility according to her preferences. 20 Thus, economists model
the problem of individual choice as one of constrained maximization in
which the individual chooses among her feasible opportunities to maxi-
mize individual utility.
This model of individual choice suggests at least two methods by
which society might seek to influence individual behavior.21 The first
16. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONoMIcs 20-21 (1987); H. VARIAN,
MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 115 (2d ed. 1984).
17. H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 290 (2d ed. 1984).
18. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMIcS 33 (1987); H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 111 (2d ed. 1984).
19. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 53 (1987); H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 113 (2d ed. 1984).
20. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMIcS 35 (1987); H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 111-12 (2d ed. 1984). To assume an individuals' preferences are "complete" is to assume
that for any pair of feasible opportunities, the individual can rank the opportunities according to her
preferences. The assumption of reflexivity means that the individual must view each opportunity as
at least as good as an identical opportunity. The assumption of transitivity means that if the individ-
ual prefers opportunity A to opportunity B, and prefers opportunity B to opportunity C, then the
individual prefers opportunity A to opportunity C To facilitate analysis and ensure the existence of
unique individual choices among feasible opportunities, economists sometimes must also assume the
individual's opportunity set is concave or quasi-concave and this individual's preferences exhibit the
properties of continuity, monotonicity, local nonsatiation, and convexity. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDI-
ATE MICROECONOMIcS 35, 44-46 (1987); H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIc ANALYSIS 112-13 (2d ed.
1984). For a survey of empirical works testing the extent to which individuals preferences actually
fulfill these assumptions, see Schoemaker, The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evi.
dence and Limitations, 20 J. ECON. LITERATURE 529 (1982).
21. This statement is made assuming perfect information, rationality, and that the individual's
choice among opportunities is not a "corner solution," where the individual's opportunities or pref-
erences are so skewed as to dictate a specific decision. If we were to relax the assumptions of perfect
information and rationality, then we might find that the economic model suggests additional meth-
ods by which society could influence individual behavior: supplying information or promoting ra-
tional thought. Consideration of such methods is beyond the scope of this Article.
If the individual's choice is a "corner solution," then society can influence that decision only by
shaping the skewed function. Examples of such corner solutions include a person who so thor-
oughly enjoys a crime there is no criminal sanction that will induce her to choose non-criminal
activity, and an honest person who commits a crime to survive. In the first example, changes in the
criminal's opportunities will not induce non-criminal behavior. If society is to affect the individual's
decision, then it must do so by shaping her preferences. This example has been referred to in the
literature as a "non-deterrable crime." See infra note 65. In the second example, all but the most
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would be to construct policies to shape the opportunities from among
which an individual can choose. Society might use fines, taxes, or subsi-
dies to improve the individual's opportunities for desired behavior rela-
tive to her opportunities for undesired behavior. The second would be to
construct policies to shape the preferences upon which the individual
makes her choice. Society might use punishments, rewards, or education
to instill preferences for desired behavior. Traditionally, economists ana-
lyze only the opportunity-shaping method of affecting individual behav-
ior, assuming that individual preferences are exogenous and
immutable.22 The adequacy of this assumption is explored more fully in
my analysis of the preference-shaping solution.23
In the context of crime, the individual must decide whether spend-
ing time in criminal or non-criminal activity will bring the most utility.
2 4
This decision will depend on the individual's criminal and non-criminal
opportunities, and the individual's preferences with respect to those op-
portunities. All other things being equal, a person will decide to engage
in crime if either his criminal opportunities are sufficiently remunerative
in comparison with his non-criminal opportunities, or the person has a
sufficiently low distaste for criminal activity. Society can discourage
criminal behavior by using penalties and subsidies to shape individual
opportunities in favor of a non-criminal decision, or by using punish-
ments, rewards, or education to shape preferences in favor of non-crimi-
nal behavior. In terms of the traditional theories of criminal punishment,
policies that decrease the expected remuneration of crime or the individ-
ual's taste for crime are said to deter criminal activity, whereas those
activities that increase the expected remuneration of non-criminal activi-
ties or the individual's taste for non-criminal activity are said to rehabili-
tate the individual.25
radical changes in the criminal's preferences will fail to induce non-criminal behavior. What is
needed is a change in the criminal's opportunity set. The reader might recognize such a crime as one
committed out of necessity. For an in-depth discussion of the necessity defense, see infra note 138
and accompanying text.
22. For an example of the analysis of individual choice, see H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE
MICROECONOMIcS 70-83 (1987); H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 118-20 (2d ed. 1984).
23. See infra note 79-82 and accompanying text.
24. For an excellent model of the individual's choice to engage in crime that takes into account
differing preferences for criminal and non-criminal activity, see Block & Heineke, A Labor Theoretic
Analysis of the Criminal Choice, 65 Am. ECON. REv. 314 (1975).
25. Economists sometimes associate shaping opportunities with the deterrence theory of pun-
ishment and shaping preferences with the rehabilitation theory of punishment. See, e.g., Ehrlich, On
the Usefulness of Controlling Individuals: An Economic Analysis of Rehabilitation, Incapacitation,
and Deterrence, 71 Am. ECON. REv. 307, 311 (1981) (deterrence aims to modify the "price of crime"
for offenders while rehabilitation attempts to remove offenders from the market for offenses). This
approach is an inaccurate characterization of the concepts of deterrence and rehabilitation. Legal
theorists would define these concepts more as I have, with each including both opportunity- and
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Economics has two criteria for judging the desirability of behavior
or policies from a societal perspective. The first is Pareto optimality. A
society is said to be in a Pareto optimal state if resources are distributed
among the members of that society in such a way that no redistribution
of resources can make one member better off without making another
member worse off.26 Such a distribution of resources is said to be "allo-
catively efficient" or just "efficient." 27 When a society is in a Pareto opti-
mal state, there exist no voluntary trades that can benefit people. 28 If
such an exchange existed, a redistribution of resources would be possible
(by making the voluntary exchange) that would benefit at least one mem-
ber of society without hurting another, and the state could not be said to
be Pareto optimal. The concept of Pareto optimality is useful because it
allows limited comparisons among different states of society without re-
quiring interpersonal comparisons of utility. If society is not in a Pareto
optimal state and some change can be made that will make a member
better off without making anyone worse off, there is a strong normative
argument for making that change.
The second criterion is social welfare maximization. This criterion
is necessary because the Pareto optimal criterion does not specify a
unique optimal state for society. The specification of the Pareto optimal
state for a society depends on the initial distribution of assets in that
society and the preferences held by its members. 29 Accordingly, a differ-
ent Pareto optimal state is possible for each permutation of initial assets
preference-shaping aspects. The distinction legal theorists draw between the two is that deterrent
policies are "negative," using punishment or fear, whereas rehabilitative policies are "well-inten-
tioned," using rewards or education. G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 414 (1978); J.
WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 173 (rev. ed. 1983). Ehrlich himself recognizes this inaccuracy
in the common economic characterization. Ehrlich, supra, at 314. The distinction between "nega-
tive" and "well intentioned" polices in legal theory may have relevance for the economic model since
deterrent policies decrease the potential criminal's utility, whereas rehabilitative policies increase the
potential criminal's utility and social welfare. However, deterrent policies may increase social wel-
fare through the satisfaction of retributive desires which rehabilitative policies cannot fulfill.
26. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 484 (1987); H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 198 (2d ed. 1984).
27. E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND APPLICATION 559 (3d ed.
1989); T. KOOPMANS, THREE ESSAYS ON THE STATE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 49 (1957). The term
"Pareto efficient" is also equivalent. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 484 (1987); H.
VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 198 (2d ed. 1984). There are other economic concepts of
efficiency, for example Kaldor-Hicks efficiency or Koopmans' efficiency, but these concepts are
much less commonly used. . QUIRK & R. SAPOSNIK, INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
THEORY AND WELFARE ECONOMICS 120-24 (1968).
28. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 485 (1987).
29. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 529 (1987); H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 206 (2d ed. 1984).
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and preferences that is possible for that society. 30 To choose among the
different possible Pareto optimal states, economists hypothesize a social
preference ordering in which society ranks each possible state of society
from least to most preferred.31 This social preference ordering depends
on individual preferences as to possible states of society and is deter-
mined through the political system. 32 Economists postulate that the so-
cial preference ordering can be represented by a social welfare function
that specifies the amount of welfare society derives from each state.
33
Although the social welfare function may specify a unique welfare
maximizing state, social welfare analysis introduces greater subjectivity
into the economic analysis. Arrow has shown that, if each individual in a
democracy merely votes according to her preference ordering, the result-
ing social preference ordering may not exhibit the characteristics of com-
pleteness, reflexivity and transitivity that economists associate with
rationality.34 To ensure a rational social preference ordering, economists
usually assume that interpersonal comparisons of the intensity of individ-
uals' preferences are possible, and that the intensity of individuals' pref-
erences is reflected in the social preference ordering.35 If one allows
preferences to vary, then it is also necessary to assume that intertaste
comparisons of the intensity of an individual's preferences are possible,
and that intertaste intensity is also reflected in the social preference or-
30. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 529 (1987); H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 206, 209 (2d ed. 1984). This result is implied in the Second Theorem of Welfare Econom-
ics, which states that for any Pareto optimal state there exists a set of prices and an initial distribu-
tion of assets such that the Pareto optimal state can be maintained as a competitive equilibrium. H.
VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 499, 500 (1987); J. QUIRK & R. SAPOSNIK, supra note
27, at 129.
31. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICs 529 (1987); H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 206-07 (2d ed. 1984); J. QUIRK & R. SAPOSNIK, supra note 27, at 105. There is a strong
analogy between the social preference ordering and the individual preference ordering previously
discussed.
32. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 532 (1987); H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 206 (2d ed. 1984); J. QUIRK & R. SAPOSNIK, supra note 27, at 105.
33. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMIcS 532-33 (1987); H. VARIAN,
MICROECONOMIc ANALYSIS 206 (2d ed. 1984); J. QUIRK & R. SAPOSNIK, supra note 27, at 105.
34. K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46 (2d ed. 1963); see also H.
VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMIcS 532 (1987) (discussing Arrow's theorem); and J.
QUIRK & R. SAPOSNIK, supra note 27, at 108-09 (same). Although Arrow originally titled his theo-
rem the General Possibility Theorem for Social Welfare Functions, this interesting result has come
to be known as Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.
35. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMIcS 532-33 (1987); J. QUIRK & R. SAPOSNIK,
supra note 27, at 115. To facilitate analysis and ensure a unique maximum for the social preference
ordering, it is also useful to assume that society's utility possibility is concave or quasi-concave and
that the social preference ordering exhibits the characteristics of continuity, monotonicity, local non-
satiation and convexity. H. VARIAN, supra, at 44-46, 535-56.
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dering. 36 To account for these interpersonal and intertaste comparisons,
the social welfare function has been modeled as a summation of individ-
ual utility functions which reflect the intensity of preference in their mea-
sure of utility.37 It is not necessary that utility derived from different
activities or enjoyed by different individuals be weighted equally in this
social welfare function. The necessity of interpersonal and intertaste
comparisons, as well as the subjective form of the social welfare function,
introduce subjectivity into the normative conclusions that can be drawn
from social welfare analysis.
B. The Problem of Crime as an Externality
In economic analysis, crime can be characterized as an externality.
An externality is an action or activity by which a person realizes her
preferences, despite the fact other people have incompatible preferences,
and this incompatibility is not accommodated through the market. 38
Because of the incompatibility in preferences, the person who undertakes
the activity imposes costs on the people she affects who have incompati-
ble preferences. These costs may be distributional in terms of the frustra-
tion of the affected people's preferences, or allocational in terms of the
cost of precautionary measures they undertake to avoid the effects of the
activity.39 Because there is no market in which the losers can charge the
winner for the costs they suffer, these costs are "external" to the winner's
decision whether or not to engage in the activity. As a result, the winner
may decide to undertake the activity even though the benefits she derives
are less than the costs she imposes on other people. This state is clearly
not Pareto optimal since the losers could be made better off without mak-
ing the winner worse off merely by bribing the winner to yield to their
preferences. A bribe worth slightly more than the benefit of the activity
to the winner, but less than the cost of the activity to the losers, should
convince the winner to cease the activity, leaving both the winner and the
36. McManus, Social Welfare Optimization with Tastes as Variables, 114 WELTWIRTSCHAF-
TLICHES ARCHIVE 101, 102 (1978).
37. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 533 (1987); H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 207 (2d ed. 1984).
38. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 542-43 (1987); H. VARIAN,
MICROECONOMIc ANALYSIS 259 (2d ed. 1984). More specifically, this definition and the example of
crime represent what is known as a negative externality. There are also positive externalities in
which a person's activity causes external benefits that are not accounted for in his decision to under-
take the activity. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 542 (1987). For example, a bee.
keeper's labors would benefit a neighboring apple grower and the apple grower's efforts would also
benefit the beekeeper. Id. I use the term "externality" to refer to a negative externality in the text
merely for purposes of exposition.
39. Skogh, A Note on Gary Becker's "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," 75
SWED. J. ECON. 305, 307 (1973).
[Vol. 1990:1
PREFERENCE SHAPING
losers better off. To curtail the externality through such a bribe would
also increase social welfare, assuming society valued the increase in util-
ity to either the winner or losers.
To give this analysis meaning for the problem of crime, imagine a
society in which crime is not discouraged by a criminal justice system.
Every person runs the risk of theft and, in turn, is free to steal from other
people. Assuming that there is incompatibility of preferences in that
some people desire to consume the fruits, of their labor rather than give
them away while other people desire to take and consume those same
fruits, and that there is sufficient opportunity for the other people to take
and consume those fruits, then theft will occur. The benefit of theft to
the perpetrator is the value he places on the stolen good. The perpetrator
imposes on the victim distributional costs in the form of the victim's
value of the good that is lost and imposes on all potential victims alloca-
tional costs in the form of the precautions they take to prevent crime-
purchasing locks, finding or creating safe hiding places, purchasing
weapons, and standing guard. Assuming the benefits the thief obtains by
theft are less than the costs he imposes on the victim and potential vic-
tims, this situation is not Pareto optimal. Theoretically, potential victims
could bribe the thief to end his life of crime for some amount greater than
the benefits the thief derives from theft but less than the amount that
theft costs the potential victims. The potential victims would retain more
of the fruits of their labor, making themselves better' off without making
the thief worse off.4° The increase in utility to the potential victims from
achieving such an agreement to end crime would increase social
welfare.41
C. The Traditional Solution-Shaping Opportunities
Traditionally, economists treat preferences as exogenous and im-
mutable and only examine changes in opportunities.42 When viewed
from this perspective, the problem of externalities becomes one of a miss-
40. Although such "protection" contracts are not unheard of, the problems of enforcing such
agreements in a lawless society and the transaction costs of including all potential thieves and vic-
tims in such an agreement probably prevent the use of such agreements as a general solution to the
problem of crime. Thus, the bargaining solution to the problem of externalities hypothesized by
Coase is not available for the problem of crime. See generally Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J. L. & ECON. 1, 18 (1960) (where there are no transaction costs, individuals will efficiently bargain
to accommodate externalities).
41. It is more problematic whether the increase in utility to the thief, derived by extortion,
would be included in the social welfare function.
42. Some economists even use this assumption to define the discipline and distinguish it from
sociology, psychology, and ethics, which deal with the formation and ranking of preferences. Mc-
Kean & Keller, The Shaping of Tastes, Pareto Efficiency and Economic Policy, 12 J. oF BEHAV.
ECON. 23, 23-24 (1983).
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ing market. An externality presents an efficiency and social welfare prob-
lem because there is no market in which the person who undertakes the
activity is charged the costs the activity imposes on other people.
The traditional solution to this problem is to impose a tax on the
externality equal to its external costs.4 3 This solution was first proposed
by Arthur Pigou and accordingly is called a "Pigouvian tax.""4 The
Pigouvian tax, in essence, creates a "market" in which the person who
undertakes the externality is charged with the external costs of her activ-
ity.45 The person is thus forced to take into account-or "internalize"-
these costs in deciding whether to engage in the activity, and she will
decide to engage in the activity only if the benefits she receives exceed the
external costs. As a result, the costs of the activity no longer exceed its
benefits, opportunities for bribes to improve someone's position no longer
exist, and society achieves Pareto optimality and increases social welfare.
This traditional solution is the one analyzed by Gary Becker in his
economic model of crime.46 Becker envisioned the criminal sanction as a
"tax" or price that society imposes on crime to make criminal opportuni-
ties less remunerative.4 7 In the Pigouvian tradition, Becker argued that
society could reduce criminal activity to the efficient level by setting the
criminal penalty so that its ex ante expected value is equal to the exter-
nal costs of the crime.48 With such a sanction, a person would commit a
crime only if his benefits from the crime exceeded the costs of the crime
to society.49 Because criminals are not always caught and convicted, the
actual penalty imposed on a convicted criminal would have to exceed the
external costs of the crime so that the expected value of the penalty
43. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 554 (1987); H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 261 (2d ed. 1984).
44. See A. PIGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 256-62 (2d ed. 1924).
45. The question naturally arises whether the people who suffer the costs of the externality
should not be compensated from the tax for those costs. This question has been resolved in favor of
compensation in tort law, but not in criminal law. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
46. Becker, supra note 2.
47. Id. at 191-92. The actual amount of this tax would be equal to the cost of the criminal
sanction to the criminal in terms of the fines and the pain and lost wages of imprisonment which are
imposed after conviction for the crime.
48. Id. The ex ante expected value of the criminal sanction is equal to the probability the
criminal will be caught and convicted, times the cost of the criminal sanction to the criminal. The ex
ante expected value is the relevant figure in considering the individual's decision whether to commit
a crime since a rational person would discount the costs of the criminal sanction by the probability
he will actually suffer that sanction in deciding whether to commit the crime. See generally H.
VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 216 (1987); H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS
155-58 (2d ed. 1984). The external costs of crime include the distributional costs of the harm done
to the victims and the allocative costs of deterring crime, including the costs of our criminal justice
system in catching and punishing criminals. Skogh, supra note 39, at 306-08, 310.
49. Becker, supra note 2, at 191.
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equaled the external costs.50 Moreover, because the optimal criminal
sanction depends only on the external costs of the crime and the
probability the criminal will be caught and convicted, the criminal sanc-
tion for a given crime should be the same for everyone with a similar
probability of being caught.51 Finally, because in Becker's model the
only purpose of criminal penalties is to give incentives for efficient behav-
ior, the objective of criminal punishment can be met equally well by im-
posing a jail term or its monetary equivalent in a fine. Becker argued
that, to minimize the costs of our criminal justice system, we should rely
first on monetary fines and resort to more costly imprisonment only for
criminals who can not afford to pay an appropriate fine.52
However, Becker did not confine himself to analyzing the problem
of crime from an efficiency perspective. Instead he extended the analysis
to a social welfare perspective, arguing that an appropriate Pigouvian tax
would minimize the "social costs" of crime.53 The problem with this
extension of the argument is that, although a Pigouvian tax may ensure a
Pareto optimal result, there is no a priori reason to assume society will
choose the Pareto optimal state that results from the current distribution
of initial assets and preferences in choosing among Pareto optimal states
to maximize social welfare. A Pigouvian tax balances the benefits of
crime to the criminal against the costs of crime to society in determining
the efficient level of crime. To elevate this analysis to a social welfare
argument is to implicitly assume that society values the benefits of crime
to criminals and includes those benefits in its determination of the social
welfare maximizing state of the world. 54
There seems good reason to doubt that criminal benefits are in-
cluded in the social welfare function. First, the notion of including crim-
inal benefits in the concept of social welfare seems to defy common sense.
Indeed, my own anecdotal observation is that unless people are thor-
50. Since the probability of being caught and convicted is less than one, the expected value of
the criminal sanction is always less than the actual penalty. See supra note 48.
51. If criminal sanctions are adjusted so that the expected value of the criminal sanction equals
the external costs of the crime, it must be that the actual criminal sanction now equals the external
costs of the crime-divided by the probability the person will be caught and convicted. Accordingly,
for a given crime with given external costs, the actual penalty imposed on convicted offenders must
be the same for people with a similar probability of being caught and convicted.
52. Becker, supra note 2, at 193.
53. Id. at 181-85.
54. Klevorick has pointed out that the assumption that society values the utility derived from
all activities the same, is also implicit in Coase's argument that all externalities are reciprocal in
nature. Klevorick, Economic Theory of Crime, supra note 5, at 300 (discussing Coase, supra note
40.) If society does not value criminal benefits in the social welfare function, this fact would under-
mine Coase's reciprocity argument from a societal perspective, at least with respect to exteralities
that are crimes. Cf Klevorick, Economic Theory of Crime, supra note 5, at 300.
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oughly steeped in efficiency theory, they generally are shocked to find
that some economists argue for a balancing of the benefits of crime to the
criminal against the costs of crime to society in determining the optimal
level of crime. Even among economists, there is a growing consensus
that criminal benefits should carry no weight in the social welfare
function.55
Second, the examples of socially beneficial crimes that are com-
monly given to support or explain Becker's social welfare analysis are
unconvincing. The two most common are parking violations and the
"Goldilocks parable" of a person who steals food to survive. 56 As I will
argue below, crimes such as parking violations, which are merely malum
prohibitum, are basically torts that are enforced by the state.57 Their
social welfare analysis varies greatly from core criminal acts such as
theft, rape, and murder, which are malum in se. In the case of the Goldi-
locks parable, the person's decision to commit the crime is dictated by
her opportunity set-either the person commits the crime or she dies.58
The fact that we find such actions justified does not mean society in gen-
eral values the benefits criminals derive from crime.
Finally, certain practices under our criminal justice system suggest
we do not value the benefit of crime to the criminal. First, we punish
repeat offenders more severely than first time offenders to ensure that
future decisions to violate the law are not made on the same cost-benefit
analysis as past infractions.5 9 This practice suggests we do not accept the
idea of a socially beneficial crime, since repeating the same offense is met
55. See, eg., id. at 293-94 (some say there is no evidence society places value on criminal's
benefit; some say no weight only when crime subject to imprisonment-not fines); Shavell, Criminal
Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1234
(1985) (analyst can assume that social benefits from an act are zero and he is thus able to study a
society that finds some acts objectionable no matter how high the private benefits); Dau-Schmidt,
Sentencing Antitrust Offenders: Reconciling Economic Theory With Legal Theory, 9 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 75, 90 (1984) (criminal benefits receive no weight in the social welfare function); Stigler, The
Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. OF POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970) (doubtful that concept of
"social value of the gain to offenders" is useful, since society has branded utility illicit). R. COOTER
& T. ULEN, supra note 7, at 538-39; Lewin & Trumbull, The Social Value of Crime?, 10 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. - (forthcoming 1990); Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1525
n.27, 1549 n.58 (1985). Even Becker realized the subjective and controversial nature of his analysis.
See Becker, supra note 2, at 209 ("[r]easonable men will often differ on the amount of damages or
benefits caused by different activities").
56. See A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTiON TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 75-86 (2d ed. 1989)
(parking violation); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 206 (3d ed. 1986) (Goldilocks para-
ble); Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69
AM. ECON. REv. 880, 886-87 (1979) (parking violation).
57. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
58. For a discussion of the necessity defense see infra note 138 and accompanying text.




with increasing penalties even though the external costs of the later
crimes may be the same.60 Second, we exclude certain serious offenders
from the political determination of what maximizes social welfare by re-
voking their right to vote and hold office.61 This exclusion helps ensure
that criminal utility is not valued in the social welfare function, or at
least is under-represented. 62
If, in fact, society gives no weight to criminal benefits in the social
welfare function, what implications does this have for the use of criminal
penalties to shape opportunities and promote behavior that maximizes
social welfare? The only author to deal seriously with this question to
date is Steven Shavell. 63 The simple answer is that if criminal acts have
no social value, then criminal penalties should be set so high that the
potential criminal's benefits never exceed his expected costs and crimes
are never committed. 64 This solution would have the additional benefit
that, because crimes are never committed, society would never have to
spend resources actually punishing criminals. 65 However, Shavell has
60. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 55, at 88.
61. See Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons" Citizenship, Criminality, and "The Purity
of the Ballot Box," 102 HARV. L. REv. 1300, 1302-03 (1989).
62. The fact we do not enforce "protection" agreements in which one person agrees not to
commit crimes against another in return for money also probably suggests society does not value the
benefits of crime.
Some might protest that certain crimes increase efficiency or benefit non-criminals. For exam-
ple, insider trading may reduce the time it takes for a stock price to reflect relevant information
benefiting all market participants. As another example, honest businessmen in poor areas may bene-
fit from the money drug trade brings into the area. Although my assessment is entirely subjective, I
would argue that to the extent the criminal benefits from increased efficiency, society does not value
the change. The criminal's benefit from increased efficiency is not different from the benefit a thief
obtains when she values the good more than the victim, as reflected in their's willingness to steal the
good despite high expected costs of punishment. To the extent the crime benefits non-criminals,
these benefits may be included in the social welfare function and may induce laxer enforcement
against such crimes.
63. Shavell, supra note 55. Posner has also dabbled in opportunity-shaping analysis, assuming
that society does not value the benefits of some or most crimes. Posner, An Economic Theory of the
Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1193, 1215 (1985).
64. Shavell, supra note 55, at 1242.
65. However, society would have to expend some resources to maintain a credible threat of
apprehending and punishing criminals. Id. at 1242-43. For purposes of exposition, I have simplified
Shavell's analysis. Although Shavell acknowledges society does not value most crimes, he argues
that some crimes may be socially beneficial, citing traffic violations and the Goldilocks parable as
examples. Id. at 1235, 1243. Shavell also argues that some crimes may be undeterrable because of
an individual's preferences or because individuals do not always act rationally. Id. at 1242 n.38.
Shavell suggests a crime committed during a fit of "uncontrollable rage" as an example of an un-
deterrable crime. Id. at 1243. However, Shavell asserts that, under perfect information, courts will
identify beneficial and undeterrable crimes and never punish them. Beneficial crimes will not be
punished because the courts do not want to discourage socially beneficial acts. Undeterrable crimes




pointed out that in the real world of imperfect information such an ideal
solution is impossible.66 Crimes always will be committed since some
criminals will mistakenly believe the benefits of crime outweigh the ex-
pected penalties, and the legislature will mistakenly set penalties too low
for some crimes. 67 Courts will try and convict people, some mistakenly,
and sentence them to suffer the high criminal penalties. 68 High criminal
penalties will deter people from desirable, but only marginally lawful,
activity because they are uncertain whether they will be convicted of a
crime.69 Finally, arbitrarily high criminal penalties will destroy marginal
incentives for good behavior. If robbery and murder both carry the
death penalty, we may have many fewer robberies; but in those that do
occur, the criminal will be very likely to kill all witnesses since his crimi-
nal punishment will be the same.70 As a result, increasing penalties to
prevent crime imposes costs on society in the forms of the mistaken pun-
ishment of innocent people, deterrence of beneficial but marginally law-
ful activity, and destruction of marginal incentives for good behavior.
Shavell concludes that, for opportunity-shaping purposes, the expected
value of the criminal penalty for a crime should be set so that the social
benefits of the penalty in preventing crime equal the social costs of the
penalty listed above.71 The optimal expected value of the criminal pen-
alty may well exceed the external costs of the crime, but it cannot be set
arbitrarily high to maximize social welfare.72
However, if society gives no value to criminal benefits in the social
welfare function, another mode of affecting individual behavior and
preventing crime may also be appropriate: the shaping of individual
preferences.
D. An Alternative Solution-Shaping Preferences
If we treat opportunities as fixed and examine only changes in pref-
erences, the problem of externalities becomes one of incompatible prefer-
ences. The realization of one person's preferences imposes costs on
people with incompatible preferences in the form of the direct frustration
66. Id. at 1243.
67. Id. at 1242 & n.38, 1243. Shavell also argues that crimes will always be committed because
some crimes are undeterrable. Id. at 1243.
68. Id. Shavell also includes people who have committed undeterrable crimes among those
who are mistakenly punished because he sees it as futile and wasteful to punish undeterrable acts,
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1245. George Stigler was the first to raise this argument against setting criminal
penalties arbitrarily high. See Stigler, supra note 55, at 526-27.




of their preferences and the resources they expend to protect themselves
from the externality.
The obvious solution to this problem is to shape peoples' preferences
so that they are compatible. If peoples' preferences are compatible, no
one's preferences will be frustrated, and there will be no need to expend
resources on precautionary measures.
Economists have been slow to examine this preference-shaping solu-
tion for several reasons.73 First, changes in preferences are less readily
observable than the changes in taxes, prices, and wages that make up
changes in opportunities. Moreover, if opportunities change at the same
time that preferences change, it is difficult to separate the simultaneous
effects of these changes on behavior.74 Second, a complete model of a
societal preference-shaping policy requires specification of the prefer-
ence-shaping technology and the process by which society gives some
peoples' preferences preeminence over others' in the social welfare func-
tion.75 Economists have little expertise in these areas and traditionally
73. Marschak has succinctly and colorfully stated the perils of relaxing the assumption of exog-
enous preferences as follows:
To enter the field of taste changes one ought to find danger exhilarating. The perils are
extreme. First, the very ground threatens to fall away at one's feet: the economist, as
policy adviser, is supposed to seek efficiency, but whether a given policy is efficient depends
upon the preferences of those affected, and those'preferences may depend in turn on policy.
Second, if one continues to believe that even in a world of changeable tastes the foundation
for policy and prediction has to be a theory of individual rational choice, then one risks
turning Economic Man into a complex monster of calculated schizophrenia, who chooses
or manipulates future mutations of himself. Third, and most alarming of all, one risks
discovering that true progress in this field means entering long-forbidden territory; explor-
ing the structure of human contentment from the inside; searching beyond the hints about
what people want that are given by the old familiar economic observable (prices, incomes,
and quantities demanded); and becoming at last full and active partners with "behavioral
scientists," unrigorous as they may be, shaping their work as well as learning from it.
Marschak, On the Study of Taste Changing Policies, 68 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 386
(1978).
74. In economics, such a problem is known as a simultaneity problem. Economists have dealt
successfully with simultaneity problems in other areas. For instance, market price and quantity are
a function of changes in both supply and demand.
75. The idea of a preference-shaping or opportunity-shaping technology is analogous to the
economists' conception of a production technology. A production technology specifies all the feasi-
ble combinations of inputs that can be used to produce a given output. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE
MICROECONOMICS 310 (1987); see also H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 8 (2d ed. 1984).
For example, a shoe manufacturer may know that to produce one pair of shoes he must combine 15
minutes of labor with 15 minutes of machine time and the necessary materials or combine two hours
of labor with a scissors, needle, and hammer, and the necessary materials. Given the prices of labor,
machines, scissors, shoes, etc., the profit maximizing shoe manufactuer can decide how best to pro-
duce shoes and how many shoes to make. Similarly, a preference-shaping technology specifies all
feasible combinations of inputs-for example condemnation, prison time, psychological therapy,
etc.-that can be used to produce a given change in individual preferences. Given the social costs of
preference-shaping inputs and the social benefits of changing preferences, society can determine how
best to change preferences and to what extent to engage in preference-shaping activity. See infra
note 101 and accompanying text.
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have left them to other disciplines.7 6 Finally, the Pareto optimal and
social welfare criteria are both based on individual preferences. Allowing
individual preferences to change undermines the basis for these criteria.
The social welfare criterion can be salvaged by assuming intertaste com-
parability of the intensity of preferences, as well as the traditional inter-
personal comparability of the intensity of preferences.77 However, the
Pareto optimal criterion is largely useless in evaluating the desirability of
changes in preferences.78
76. The job of specifying the preference-shaping technology has traditionally been the domain
of sociologists, psychologists, and child development specialists. See, e.g., R. BROWN, SOCIAL PSY-
CHOLOGY ch. VIII (1965); A. EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE, ON ETHICS, AES-
THETICS, AND "LAW" - OR CRIME, TORT, AND PROCEDURE 212 (1971); R. FLETCHER, INSTINCT
IN MAN 226-34 (1957); J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (M. Gabain trans.
1932); B.F. SKINNER, ABOUT BEHAVIORISM 224-25 (1974); Hoffman, Moral Development, in 2
CARMICHAEL'S MANUAL OF PSYCHOLOGY ch. 23 (P. Mussen 3d ed. 1970). Similarly, the job of
determining how and why some preferences are given preeminence over others in the social welfare
function traditionally has been the domain of political scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and theo-
logians. See, ag., N. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (1959); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 461 (1971); Chambliss, A SociologicalAnalysis of the Law of Vagrancy, 12 SoC. PRODS. 67
(1964). Legal theorists and criminologists have also endeavored to answer both these questions. See,
e.g., R. POUND, LAW AND MORALS (1926); R. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY
(1923); Fiss, The Death of Law?, 72 CORN. L. REv. 1, 7-8, 14-16 (1986); Fuller, Morals and the
Criminal Law, 32 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. 624 (1942); Jeffery, Crime Law and Social Structure, 47 J.
CeaM. L. CRIM. & POL. SCI. 423 (1956); Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44
S. CAL. L. REv. 362, 374 (1971). But see D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (1989); J. BUCHANAN,
THE ECONOMICS OF POLITICS (1978); J. BUCHANAN, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1965).
77. McManus, supra note 36, at 103.
78. Weisbrod has hypothesized that some preference changes may be desirable even in a Pare-
tian sense if the costs of dealing with the externality are so large that even the person whose prefer-
ences are to be changed agrees, on the basis of his unchanged preferences, that he will be better off
with the increased resources for consumption after the preference change. As Weisbrod points out,
"Consumption possibilities are not independent of preferences." Weisbrod, Comparing Utility Func-
tions in Efficiency Terms or, What Kind of Utility Functions Do We Want?, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 991,
993 (1977). From a practical perspective, however, such instances are probably rare.
The astute reader might wonder why we cannot salvage the Pareto optimal criterion in the same
way that we salvaged the social welfare criterion, by assuming intertaste'comparability of the inten-
sity of preferences? The problem is that the Pareto optimal criterion evaluates whether a state of
society is better or worse from each individual member's perspective, whereas the social welfare
criterion evaluates whether a state of society is better or worse from a societal perspective. It is the
individual perspective that gives the Pareto optimal criterion its strong normative value, and so
strongly associates it with voluntary exchange. Thus to assume intertaste comparability for purposes
of the Pareto optimal criterion would require that individuals be able to make intertaste comparisons
on their own preferences, or have second order preferences about their own preferences. Assuming
intertaste comparability for purposes of the social welfare function requires only that individuals be
able to make intertaste comparisons about other peoples' preferences, or have single order prefer-
ences about other peoples' preferences. The concept of second order or "meta" preferences has been
applied usefully by other economists. See generally George, Meta-Preferences Reconsidering Con-
temporary Notions of Free Choice, 11 INT.'L J. SOc. ECoN. 92 (No. 3, 1984); Hirschman, Against
Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories of Economic Discourse, 1 ECON. &
PHIL. 7, 8 (1985). However, adding this concept to my analysis would add further complexity with-
out changing its basic results. Even if people do voluntarily endeavor to adjust their preferences
PREFERENCE SHAPING
It is becoming increasingly apparent that the failure to address the
malleability of preferences seriously limits the explanatory power of eco-
nomic analysis. 79 Preference shaping, on an individual, organizational,
and societal level, is an important human endeavor. It has been identi-
fied as a primary or secondary goal of childrearing, education, religion,
advertising, public service announcements, legislation, and, as I argue,
criminal punishment.80 Although economists might find it useful to as-
sume that these preference-shaping processes are exogenous to their anal-
ysis of traditional markets, when economists expand their analysis to
social institutions that are more intimately related to the preference-
shaping processes, either affecting or being affected by them, this assump-
tion should be relaxed. Certainly when one is analyzing a possible pref-
erence-shaping policy, such as the criminal law, one must explore the
possible implications of endogenous preferences.81 Although it compli-
cates empirical tests and introduces greater subjectivity via the social
welfare analysis, relaxing the assumption that preferences are exogenous
promises greater understanding of many social phenomena.8 2
Based on consideration of the identified preference-shaping
processes, one might assume the following general outline for the prefer-
ence-shaping technology. The first requirement is that the person or
according to second order preferences, a social welfare maximizing preference-shaping policy could
be devised by society given the initial distribution of first and second order preferences and the
anticipated amount of voluntary change.
79. See A. ETzIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS 10 (1988); S.
KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? ECONOMISTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 45 (1981); Marschak,
supra note 73, at 386; McKean & Keller, supra note 42, at 24-25; McPherson, Want Information.
Morality, and Some "Interpretive"Aspects of Economic Inquiry, in SOCIAL SCIENCE AS MORAL IN-
QUIRY 100 (N. Haan ed. 1983). This point has also been made by various legal theorists, see West,
Taking Preferences Seriously, 64 TUL. L. REV. 659, 670 (1990); Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the
Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1694-95 (1984); Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 WIs. L.
REV. 769, 772-78 (1979). But see Stigler & Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM.
ECON. REV. 76 (1977) (arguing that all preferences are in fact innate and immutable and apparent
preference changes can be explained as people learning how to better satisfy their innate
preferences).
80. A. ETZIONI, supra note 79, at 10; J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 211-18
(1967) (advertising); S. KELMAN, supra note 79, at 45; (criminal punishment); Donohue, Prohibiting
Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337, 1338-41
(1989) (anti-discrimination legislation); Marschak, supra note 73, at 386 (public policies, advertising,
education); McKean & Keller, supra note 42, at 29 ("It is clear that firms, social groups, political
parties, government entities, friends and family consciously formulate policies to inculcate beliefs in
their members and potential members."); McKenzie, The Economic Dimensions of Ethical Behavior,
87 ETHICS 208, 214-17 (1977) (families, education, friends, religion); McManus, supra note 36, at
104 (education advertising, public service announcements); Weisbrod, supra note 78, at 944 (child-
rearing).
81. Etzioni has convincingly made this point with respect to criminal law. A. ETZIONI, supra
note 79, at 241.
82. McPherson, supra note 79, at 100.
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group of people who are endeavoring to affect another's preferences have
some legitimate claim to authority over the person, or at least have the
confidence of the person.8 3 An untrusting and defiant person is probably
a poor candidate for preference modification. The authority figure then
characterizes a behavior as either "good" or "bad" and reinforces this
characterization with rewards, punishment, and education as to why the
behavior is good or bad.84 By characterizing a behavior as good or bad
rather than just inexpensive or expensive, the authority figure indicates
need for a fundamental change in the basis upon which the affected per-
son makes decisions. Different types of punishments, rewards, and meth-
ods of education may vary in their cost and effectiveness in shaping
preferences. For example, corporal punishment in which the person ex-
periences physical pain or isolation is more costly, but also more effec-
tive, in shaping preferences than charging a fine.85 Education that shapes
preferences should not merely supply more complete information-
although this may also shape preferences-but should fundamentally
change the way the person views the behavior, for example by asking the
person to empathize with the victim.86 Finally, either positive or nega-
tive examples can shape people's preferences.8 7 Witnessing someone
else's reward or punishment for a behavior can affect a person's prefer-
ences towards that behavior.88
Families, friends, and associates will engage in the most preference-
shaping activity because they have the greatest incentives and abilities to
shape preferences. The external costs of a person's behavior are visited
largely on her family, friends, and associates. Also, the existence of in-
terdependent preferences within these relationships gives rise to pater-
83. J. RAWLS, supra note 76, at 466; Cook, Punishment and Crime: A Critique of Findings
Concerning the Preventive Effects of Punishment, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 164, 177 (Winter
1977).
84. Steven Kelman has pointed out the importance of stigmatizing behavior as "bad" in shap-
ing preferences. S. KELMAN, supra note 79, at 27, 44, 47 (1981). It is my own observation, from
caring for my two sons, that this stigmatization must be followed by punishment, reward, and
education.
85. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 55, at 96-97.
86. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1584 (1987). Indeed, psychol-
ogists have argued that some people (psychopaths) are criminals precisely because of their inability
to empathize with other people. R. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STATEGIc ROLE OF
THE EMOTIONS (1988).
87. J. RAwis, supra note 76, at 471.
88. The potential for criminal punishment to affect the preferences of people other than the one
who is punished was recognized by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, who said: "Some men, probably,
abstain from murder because they fear that if they committed murder they would be hanged. Hun-
dreds of thousands abstain from murder because they regard it with horror. One great reason why
they regard murder with horror is that murderers are hanged." H. GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMI-
NAL JUSTIcE 489 (1979). Clearly, from a preference-shaping perspective, the only purpose of capital
punishment can be to shape preferences in the population as a whole.
[Vol. 1990:1
PREFERENCE SHAPING
nalistic incentives to shape other people's preferences. 89  Family
members, friends, and associates, with their shared confidence, time, and
experiences, have the best opportunity to shape each others' preferences.
Hierarchies within these relationships determine which among incompat-
ible preferences prevail.90 Parents, in particular, have a strong incentive
and ability to shape the preferences of their children and modify their
behavior in ways the parent deems desirable. 91 Because of superior in-
centives and ability to shape preferences, families, friends, and associates
will prescribe a set of desired preferences broader than that prescribed by
society at large. This broader set of desired preferences can be under-
stood as the economic description of morality.
To the extent that the preference-shaping efforts of family, friends,
and associates coincide with the preferences desired by society as a
whole, society can rely on these subgroups of people to promote its inter-
ests. However, these subgroups may sometimes fail to adequately pro-
mote society's interests. An individual may have particularly resistant
preferences, inept family, friends, and associates, or family, friends, and
associates who share and promote different preferences for behavior than
those shared and promoted by society as a whole. Even if these failures
do not occur, society will play a role in reinforcing the preference-shap-
ing activities of family, friends, and associates, and ensuring that the
preferences learned in these relationships are applied to people outside
them. Accordingly, society will have to develop a policy for the shaping
of individual preferences. But how should society formulate and evalu-
ate this policy? Which preferences should be changed and to what extent
should society expend resources in changing preferences? As previously
discussed, the Pareto optimal criterion is inappropriate for such determi-
nations. Thus, we must proceed directly to the criterion of maximizing
social welfare.
In order to specify a preference-shaping policy that maximizes social
welfare, society must first determine what constitutes social welfare. As
previously discussed, economists envision this determination as one oc-
curring through the political process.92 Through the votes of the popu-
lace and their elected representatives, society determines whose utility
and what activities will be valued. The utility derived from some activi-
ties and their associated preferences may be highly valued, whereas util-
89. Although paternalism is undoubtedly an incentive for preference shaping at a societal level,
it is generally a stronger incentive among family members, friends and associates.
90. J. RAwLS, supra note 76, at 467.
91. McKean & Keller, supra note 42, at 29-32; McKenzie, supra note 80, at 214-16; Weisbrod,
supra note 78, at 994.
92. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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ity derived from other activities and their associated preferences may not
be valued at all.93 This ordering of utilities and preferences may be made
on the basis of economic, ethical, or political considerations. With few
exceptions, 94 this ordering cannot be unanimous.95 By definition, indi-
viduals desire the activities they prefer and will dissent from the subjuga-
tion of their preferences to other people's preferences. Accordingly, the
social welfare function and the optimal preference-shaping policy that it
specifies must be formulated by one group of people imposing their
desires on another group of people through society's political structure.
Once society has specified its social welfare function, it then can pro-
ceed to construct a preference-shaping policy to maximize that function.
The optimal preference-shaping policy would be one in which society
changed those preferences for which the social benefits of the change ex-
ceed the social costs. 96 The social benefits consist of the value that soci-
ety places on the utility derived by the people whose preferences would
escape frustration with the change in preferences, the value society places
on the utility derived from the newly formed compatible preferences, and
the savings in resources spent to avoid the externality. The social costs
consist of the value that society places on the utility derived from the
preferences that would be modified and lost, and the resources spent on
shaping preferences. 97 The social costs might also include the value soci-
ety places on any loss of individual autonomy that accompanies the
change in preferences. 98 The necessity of interpersonal and intertaste
93. Legal theorists have long recognized that one of the law's primary functions is the ordering
of values or preferences. R. POUND, LAW AND MORALS (1926); R. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF
LEGAL HISTORY (1923); Fiss, supra note 76, at 7-8, 14-16; Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 76, at
374.
94. Weisbrod hypothesizes that there may be some preference changes for which the cost-sav-
ing to the person whose preferences are changed is large enough that he or she would agree to the
preference change even on the basis of his or her current preferences. Thus, such a preference
change could be agreed to unanimously. Weisbrod, supra note 78, at 993. However, from practical
perspective such instances are probably rare.
95. Marschak, supra note 73, at 387-89; McManus, supra note 36, at 101.
96. McManus, supra note 36, at 112. The balancing of social benefits and costs to determine
the optimal policy is a familiar result of social welfare analysis. It assumes that there are declining
marginal social benefits and increasing marginal social costs in the changing of preferences. By
following this rule, society maximizes social welfare because it undertakes all preference changes
that promise a net increase in social welfare.
97. Indeed, without costs to check the preference-shaping policy, the optimal policy becomes
quite simple-change preferences to abolish want by making people very happy with very little.
Although this possibility seems farfetched, it is perhaps the objective of some religious groups that
require vows of poverty. A cult might be distinguished from these groups in that a cult is led by a
cynical person who convinces people they are happy with very little and then makes himself very
happy with the surplus of their labors. The phenomenon can also be explained by the incentives
religions offer in the form of eternal rewards. McKenzie, supra note 80, at 216-19.
98. On the surface, it seems plain that a preference-shaping policy would entail a loss of indi-
vidual autonomy. It would certainly limit free will, the concept Nozick uses to define individual
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comparisons of the intensity of preferences comes in balancing the bene-
fits some individuals enjoy in the liberation of their preferences against
the possible costs other individuals incur from the change in their prefer-
ences. Society could use this social welfare maximizing rule of balancing
social benefits and costs to specify an optimal set of social norms for
behavior to which it would attempt to conform individual preferences.
Of course, the social welfare function is a theoretical construct not
subject to precise definition. Scholars could argue endlessly about its
form, as well as whose utility and what activities are included. Given
this indeterminacy in the model, what can "objectively" be said about the
optimal preference-shaping policy?99
First, there are some individual preferences society will have no in-
centive to change. Preferences that are entirely a matter of personal con-
sumption-for instance, whether I have beans or peas for dinner-do not
interfere with anyone else's preferences or impose external costs on other
people. Hirschman has designated such preferences as "tastes," whereas
he designates incompatible preferences that give rise to controversy as
"values. ' ' 1°° One should note, however, how easily a taste may become a
value. For instance, if we are talking about a person's preference for
beans or meat, that preference may be a value for a person who believes
in reincarnation or takes seriously the marginal impact their consump-
tion of meat has on world grain prices and world hunger.
Second, assuming that the cost technology of changing preferences
is similar for all preferences, the preferences subject to the most extensive
efforts of modification will be those whose realization is assigned no value
in the social welfare function and which interfere with preferences whose
realization is highly valued in the social welfare function. Changing such
preferences would yield society the greatest net social benefit because so-
ciety highly values the realization of the preferences that are saved from
frustration, and there is no countervailing social cost from the loss of the
realization of the preferences that are changed. This characterization of
preferences whose realization is not valued, and that interfere with pref-
autonomy. R. NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 291-99 (1981). It would also seem a grave
threat from the Kantian perspective since a conscious societal policy of shaping preferences would be
more subject to the treatment of people as means, not ends, than the inadvertent effects of society on
preferences or the opportunity- and preference-shaping efforts of our family and friends. I. KANT,
FOUNDATION OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 47 (L. Beck trans. 1959) (1st ed. 1785). However,
even the strongest proponents of individual autonomy acknowledge that the concept wanes when
confronted with another's interest in individual autonomy, as in the problem of externalities. J.
MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1982) (1st ed. 1859); R. NOZICK, supra, at 501-03.
99. I use the word "objectively" loosely here since I am seeking only the common ground about
which there is little argument. Statements about which there is no argument would seem impossible
here.
100. Hirschman, supra note 78, at 9-10.
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erences whose realization is highly valued seems to describe the prefer-
ences that give rise to criminal activity. As discussed in the last section,
there is good reason to believe that the benefits of crime receive no value
in the social welfare function. Moreover, the preferences with which
crime interferes- the desire for the integrity of one's body and prop-
erty-are among our most cherished preferences. Thus it seems reason-
able to examine criminal punishment as a preference-shaping policy.
E. Accommodation of the Two Solutions in an Optimal Policy for the
Control of Crime
Society employs both opportunity- and preference-shaping methods
to treat the problem of externalities. Indeed, the two can be viewed as
complements in producing desired behavior.10' A society that relied
solely on incentives, without some underlying basis of morality or social
norms, would soon grind to a halt. The costs of policing externalities to
ensure optimal behavior in an amoral society would prove prohibitive.10 2
Similarly, a society that relied solely on morality to promote desired be-
havior would soon find itself disappointed by people's baser instincts.'0 3
Almost anyone could be induced to commit an immoral act, given suffi-
cient opportunity. This complementary relationship is apparent even in
less extreme examples. It is cheaper to provide adequate incentives for
good behavior if people's preferences are roughly compatible, and there
is less need for society to engage in preference shaping for good behavior
if significant incentives exist for such behavior.'°4
To maximize social welfare, society will employ both opportunity-
and preference-shaping methods to the extent that their social benefits
exceed their social costs. 105 The exact mixture of the two methods used
101. Two inputs are complements when an increase in the amount of one employed leads to an
increase in the marginal product of the other. E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, supra note 27, at 434
n.l.
102. Cook, supra note 83, at 178-79; Hirschman, Morality and the Social Sciences: A Durable
Tension, in SOCIAL SCIENCE AS MORAL INQUIRY, supra note 79, at 28; McPherson, supra note 79,
at 113; Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. &
PUB. APE. 317, 332 (1977). See also Frank, If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility
Function, Would He Want One With a Conscience?, 77 AM. ECON. REv. 593 (1987) (arguing that
the economic advantages of honesty and a sense of justice ensure that people will evolve so that at
least some share these traits).
103. Hirschman, supra note 78, at 18.
104. Id.; Votey & Phillips, Social Goals and Appropriate Policy for Corrections: An Economic
Appraisal, 1 J. CRIM. JusT. 219, 231-32 (1973).
105. Just as when we looked at the opportunity- and preference-shaping policies separately, this
rule ensures the maximization of social welfare because society undertakes all opportunities for net
increases in social welfare through opportunity and preference shaping. This rule assumes that the
opportunity- and preference-shaping technologies suffer decreasing marginal benefits and increasing
marginal costs as they are used.
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and the precise techniques employed to shape opportunities and prefer-
ences will depend on the technology of behavior control. Although this
technology is very complex, it seems safe to assume that shaping oppor-
tunities is less costly than shaping preferences. This is true because op-
portunity-shaping policies (such as damages, taxes, and subsidies) are
cheaper to administer than are preference-shaping policies (such as crim-
inal fines, probation, and imprisonment). 10 6 Moreover, shaping opportu-
nities for desired behavior probably does not involve the same loss of
individual autonomy as does shaping people's preferences. Although
both infringe on free will, shaping a person's opportunities does not vio-
late individual sovereignty in the intimate way that shaping a person's
preferences does.
Accordingly, it is predictable that society will rely first on the
cheaper solution of opportunity shaping to control the problem of exter-
nalities. To this end and to the end of compensating the victims of exter-
nalities, tort law was invented. This solution will be the only one
employed for externalities in which the net social benefit of changing
preferences is negative because society values the utility obtained from
both sides of the incompatible preferences about the same. The more
costly solution of preference shaping will be reserved for externalities in
which there are substantial benefits from preference shaping that exceed
the higher social costs because there is a significant disparity in the value
society assigns to the utility derived from each side of the incompatible
preferences. To this end, criminal law was created and superimposed on
top of the structure of tort law.107
Society's efforts to shape opportunities and preferences to prevent
crime are evident from the damages and punishments for which
criminals are liable under the law. First, almost all crimes are also
torts.'0 8 Accordingly, the criminal is liable for monetary damages-as-
suming he is able to pay-that create a disincentive for criminal behav-
ior. Second, the criminal is subject to criminal punishment in the form of
106. Becker, supra note 2, at 193. Even a criminal fine has higher administrative costs than a
corresponding tax because it requires a higher burden of proof to establish liability and people are
more resistant to paying criminal fines given the moral condemnation attached to them.
107. Other means by which society could conceivably conduct a societal preference-shaping pol-
icy include public education, public service announcements, statements by popular public figures,
and non-criminal legislation. Marschak, supra note 73, at 390; McKenzie, supra note 80, at 214-16.
Presumably all of these means will be employed along with criminal punishment to the extent that
their social benefits exceed their social costs:
108. The most common exception is crimes that are merely malum prohibitum and crimes, such
as attempts, in which there is no actual harm. These crimes are not treated with the opportunity-
shaping method of tort damages because crimes that are malum prohibitum are basically torts en-
forced by the state, see infra note 189 and accompanying text, and the actual harm and appropriate
tort damages from an unseccessful attempt are zero.
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condemnation, fines, probation, and imprisonment. Criminal punish-
ment creates a disincentive for criminal behavior by imposing costs on
the criminal in the form of a fine or the pain and lost wages of imprison-
ment. Moreover, the moral condemnation and punishment of a criminal
sentence is also intended to eradicate preferences for the prohibited activ-
ity from the criminal and the rest of society. 0 9
To follow the social welfare maximizing rule in criminal punish-
ment, society should employ both opportunity- and preference-shaping
methods to the extent that their social benefits exceed their social costs.
Because criminal punishment results in both opportunity and preference
shaping, it should be employed to the extent that its combined social
benefits from both these means of controlling crime exceed its social
costs. Accordingly, in setting the optimal amount and form of the crimi-
nal sanction, society should consider the potential social benefits and
costs from each possible punishment, given the likely disincentive effects
of the tort law.' 10 For a crime that causes small social costs, and thus
presents the opportunity for small increases in social benefits from oppor-
tunity and preference shaping, society should assign a small penalty and
use a less expensive and effective preference-shaping method-for exam-
ple, condemnation with a small fine and probation. But for a crime that
causes large social costs and thus presents the opportunity for large in-
creases in social benefits from opportunity and preference shaping, soci-
ety should assign a large penalty and use a more expensive, but effective,
preference-shaping method-for example, a long prison term. Individual
characteristics of the criminal may also be relevant to the optimal
amount and form of punishment, since different individuals may be in
greater or less need of preference modification, or be more or less suscep-
tible to different methods of preference modification.
II. CRIMINAL LAW AS A PREFERENCE-SHAPING POLICY
There is considerable ambiguity in the criminal law between appli-
cations of the opportunity- and preference-shaping theories. Both meth-
ods of controlling behavior are employed in preventing crime and find
representation in the doctrine of criminal law."' Moreover, the two
methods coincide in purpose, observable effect, and, often, in their
means. As a result, policies to decrease crime can be justified by either
theory, and the success of these policies can be attributed to a change in
109. Legal theorists have recognized this purpose of criminal punishment. L. KATZ, BAD ACTS
AND GUILTY MINDS 27-28 (1987); J. GORECKI, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUsTICE (1979).
110. For many potential criminals, the likely disincentive effects of tort law are probably negligi-
ble since the defendant is judgment proof.
111. L. KATZ, supra note 109, at 27-28; J. GORECKI, supra note 109.
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either opportunities or preferences.1 12 Despite this ambiguity, it does ap-
pear that some of the fundamental characteristics of criminal law are best
explained by a preference-shaping theory.11 3
A. The Importance of Intent to Criminal Liability
The concept of intent is central to criminal law. Generally, the gov-
ernment must show that the defendant intended the proscribed harm in
order to prove her guilt in the crime and liability for criminal punish-
ment. 114 A person is not guilty of criminal battery (striking another) for
a blow inadvertently or negligently delivered.1 15 Similarly, a person is
not guilty of theft (taking another's property) for appropriating property
she mistakenly believes to be her own.116 It has been said that for pur-
poses of criminal law, a person intends a proscribed harm if she desires
her acts to cause that harm.117
This requirement of intent is puzzling under the traditional opportu-
nity-shaping theory of criminal law.1 18 If a person imposes external costs
on someone, that person should be assessed the Pigouvian tax whether or
not she intended the harm. 1 9 Certainly under tort law, intent is not
required for liability.1 20
Posner and Shavell have argued that intent is relevant to punish-
ment under the opportunity-shaping theory because it is positively re-
lated to the probability of harm and negatively related to the probability
of apprehension.1 21 A person who intends to harm someone is more
likely to achieve that harm and to plan a way to get away. Accordingly,
112. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
113. Indeed, the important role of intent, the near irrelevance of harm, and the form of punish-
ment are the fundamental characteristics that distinguish criminal law from tort law. Epstein, supra
note 6, at 248.
114. Some crimes require lesser states of mens rea including knowledge, recklessness, and gross
negligence. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 212 (2d ed. 1986).
115. Id. at 220.
116. Such a mistake could occur either because the property looks like something the person in
fact owns (a mistake of fact) or the person believes she has purchased the property but there is a legal
defect in the purchase agreement (mistake of law). These mistakes would excuse the person's con-
duct in taking the property under the criminal law because they negate the requirement that she
intend to take someone else's property. Id. at 216.
117. Id. at 217.
118. As Posner has pointed out, "one can read many books on economics without encountering
a reference to 'intent.'" Posner, supra note 63, at 1221.
119. Sort of a "you broke it, you bought it" philosophy.
120. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 4 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEETON].
121. See Posner, supra note 63, at 1221-22; Shavell, supra note 55, at 1248. Posner also raises
the arguments that intent identifies coercive transfer and deterrable behavior, but then dismisses
these justifications. Posner, supra note 63, at 1221-23. Lack of correlation with probable harm is
also the rationale given for the excuse of mistake. Shavell, supra note 55, at 1255.
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a person who intends harm and is caught should receive a larger
Pigouvian tax than someone who unintentionally causes the same
harm.122 However, it has not been adequately explained why probable,
rather than actual harm, is relevant, especially since actual harm is the
relevant concept under tort law. Moreover, even if probable harm is rele-
vant, there are other facts related to the probabilities of harm and escape
that have no similar exalted position (or indeed any relevance) in crimi-
nal punishment. If the owner of a railroad decides to operate for another
year without crossing gates, knowing several people will be killed cross-
ing his tracks, should the owner be guilty of murder when some people
are killed because this omission involved a high probability of harm?1 23
If a person commits a murder in a brightly lit restaurant with many wit-
nesses after leaving her name for a reservation, should that person re-
ceive a lighter sentence because she will be easily caught? Finally, unless
the person confesses, intent will have to be inferred from the person's
acts. So why not just infer probable harm and elusion directly from these
acts without the intermediate construct of intent?124
The preference-shaping theory of criminal law offers a ready inter-
pretation of the importance of intent. Under this theory, one of the pur-
poses of criminal punishment is to shape people's preferences when they
deviate from established social norms. A court can tell that a person's
preferences deviate from the prescribed social norms when his actions
indicate that he intended or desired to bring about the proscribed
harm.125 If the person does not intend the proscribed harm but rather
122. Posner, supra note 63, at 1221-22; Shavell, supra note 55, at 1247-48.
123. Posner attempts to distinguish this hypothetical, arguing that the owner of the railroad
benefits from the operation of the railroad, not the deaths of the people, and besides, the operation of
the railroad is probably efficient in that its benefits merit its costs. Posner, supra note 63, at 1221.
However, the fact that one benefits only indirectly from a harm has never been exonerating under
the criminal law. If I kill my favorite aunt to get her inheritance, I'm still guilty of murder. More-
over, following Pigou's analysis, the way to be sure that the railroad really is operating efficiently is
to charge the owner for its external costs. Finally, the fact that an activity may be efficient from the
perpetrator's perspective is not determinative of whether the activity is a crime, see infra note 179
and accompanying text.
124. Posner himself raises this criticism. Posner, supra note 63, at 1221.
125. The question naturally arises whether society should engage in preference shaping when it
has evidence a person has deviant preferences, even though he has not yet attempted a crime. Soci-
ety does allow the involuntary commitment and treatment of dangerously insane people even though
they have not yet attempted a crime. Perhaps with respect to people who are merely dangerously
dishonest, society defers on preference shaping until after they actually attempt a crime due to the
problems of proving such a dangerous tendency or out of deference to the value of individual auton-
omy. Several courts have held that criminal punishment of a mental state without an accompanying
act in furtherance of those preferences exceeds the constitutional powers of the state. See Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-68 (1962); People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 147, 190 N.E. 301, 303
(1934); State v. Labato, N.J. 137, 147-48, 80 A.2d 617, 622 (1951); Lambert v. State, 374 P.2d 783,
785 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962).
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causes it out of negligence or mistake, the person's acts do not indicate
deviant preferences. From a preference-shaping perspective, it does no
good to punish a person who does not have deviant preferences, either to
shape his preferences or to provide an example for the general popula-
tion. 2 6 This interpretation comports well with legal theorists' under-
standing of why the criminal law often requires proof of intent for
criminal liability. The establishment of the requisite mens rea or "guilty
mind" is necessary to show the defendant's blame-worthiness or culpabil-
ity in the committed acts. 127
B. The "Irrelevance" of Actual Harm to Criminal Liability
Under the criminal law the actual harm to the victim is of secondary
importance in the determination of criminal liability. This is true even if
the person acts with the requisite intent. A person who attempts a crime,
but fails to cause any actual harm, is subject to criminal punishment. 28
On the other hand, a person who actually commits a crime and causes
harm may not be subject to criminal punishment if the act was justified
by self-defense, duress, or necessity. 129 Although it is somewhat of an
exaggeration, Richard Epstein has argued that the harm to the victim is
irrelevant to criminal law. 130 Actual harm does play some role in crimi-
nal law: more harmful crimes tend to have more severe punishments,
successful crimes are punished more severely than attempts, and under
an optimal law enforcement policy police and prosecutors will spend
more resources to catch and prosecute perpetrators of the most harmful
crimes.
The opportunity-shaping theory of the criminal law encounters diffi-
culty in explaining this lack of connection between harm and liability. In
simple terms, if criminal punishment is the "price" for a criminal act, the
126. Of course, a government could use an innocent person as an example if the general popula-
tion believed the person was guilty. However, out of concern for preserving their legitimate authority
and the value of individual autonomy, I believe most governments generally abstain from engaging
in this practice.
127. H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW chs.
5 & 6 (1968); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 114, at 212; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL
LAw 828-29 (3d ed. 1982).
128. Rex v. Scofield, Caldecott 397 (K.B. 1784); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 114, at
495. Criminal liability may adhere even if the crime is thwarted due to impossibility. R. PERKINS &
R. BOYCE, supra note 127, at 627-35.
129. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 114, at 404-83. Necessity and duress are not always a
defense-for example, they are not a defense for murder. See, eg., Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14
Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (defense of necessity denied to three starving men who killed and ate one of their
companions); United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383) (necessity
defense denied to seamen who threw male passengers overboard from a sinking vessel to allow wo-
men and children to survive).
130. Epstein, supra note 6, at 248.
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obligation to pay that price should be associated with receipt of the
"good" and realization of the harm that it entails. Under tort law, the
general rule is that the obligation to pay is associated with the realization
of actual harm. 131
Two arguments have been put forward to justify the punishment of
attempts within the context of the opportunity-shaping model. First,
Posner and Shavel have argued that we punish criminal attempts to raise
the expected value of criminal punishment, thereby increasing the disin-
centive for criminal activity, without increasing the punishment for the
completed crime.1 32 They argue that it is cheaper to raise the expected
value of criminal punishment by punishing attempts than by increasing
the punishment for the completed crime because increasing the punish-
ment for the completed crime involves greater social costs in the mis-
taken punishment of innocent people, the deterrence of beneficial (but
marginally lawful) activity, and the destruction of marginal incentives for
good behavior. 133 But they fail to adequately explain why a similar as-
sessment of damages for activity with a high probability of harm would
not be optimal under tort law. 134 Second, Posner has argued that the
occurrence of a criminal attempt indicates a person with a high
probability of committing a crime who should have her criminal oppor-
tunities reduced to zero by incapacitation.135 Why such a drastic and
costly restriction of the person's opportunity set is optimal when the less
expensive alternative of increasing sanctions is available, is never
explained.
The preference-shaping theory of criminal law offers a more con-
vincing explanation of the punishment of attempts. The commission of
significant acts toward the completion of a crime evidences deviant pref-
131. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 120, at 6.
132. See Posner, supra note 63, at 1217; Shavell, supra note 55, at 1250. The illustration of this
principle given by Shavell is as follows:
Suppose a party who attempts a crime will succeed in doing harm half the time, that he
will be apprehended with probability 30% if he does harm and 20% if he does not, that the
disutility of the maximum sanction is 1000, and that the expected private benefit from his
act is 200. If sanctions are not imposed for unsuccessful attempts, the probability of impo-
sition of sanctions is just 1/2 X 30% = 15%, so the maximum expected sanction is only
150. Thus, since the party's expected benefits are 200, he cannot be deterred. But if the
party is punished whether or not his attempt is successful, the probability of imposition of
sanctions is 1/2 X 30% + I/2 X 20% = 25%, so the maximum expected sanction is 250;
hence the party can be deterred.
Id. at 1250 n.73.
133. See Posner, supra note 63, at 1208; Shavell, supra note 55, at 1243. Both authors also
mention increased reliance on costly imprisonment as a social cost of increasing punishment for the
completed crime. Posner, supra note 63, at 1212-13; Shavell, supra note 55, at 1235.
134. Shavell merely notes that it is generally assumed that all tortfeasors are prosecuted and all
can pay their damages, two highly unrealistic assumptions. Shavell, supra note 55, at 1250 n.71.
135. Posner, supra note 63, at 1217.
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erences that should be punished for the purpose of shaping preferences,
even if no harm actually comes from the acts. This rationale seems to
agree with the purpose of punishing attempts as discerned by legal theo-
fists. The application of corrective action to those who have sufficiently
manifested their dangerousness has been identified as the primary pur-
pose.136 The deterrence of the commission of completed crimes has been
identified as merely a secondary purpose. 137
The defense of necessity is often put forth by proponents of the op-
portunity-shaping theory of criminal law as an example of a socially ben-
eficial crime. The example commonly used is the "Goldilocks parable"
of a person who, lost in the woods, steals food from a cabin to survive.138
Such an act would be justified under the necessity defense and therefore
would not be subject to criminal punishment.' 39 This result is explained
as a case in which the social benefits of the crime outweigh its social
costs, and therefore the crime should be committed to maximize social
welfare. 4° It is argued that we do not actually punish the person who
commits a crime out of necessity because it is wasteful to punish undeter-
rable crimes.14' This explanation seems plausible. Although society
does not value the benefits of crime, in some cases the commission of a
crime may avoid a greater social harm and therefore be social welfare-
maximizing. Some legal commentators have identified this "lesser of
evils" rationale for the necessity defense.' 42
The preference-shaping theory of criminal law offers an additional
explanation of the necessity defense. Nothing can be inferred about the
deviation of a person's preferences from the social norm against theft
from the fact that the person steals to survive. Given a choice between
stealing food to survive and not stealing but dying, even a person with a
very strong preference for honesty would choose to steal. '43 Since in the
136. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 114, at 499; P. BRETT, AN INQUIRY INTO CRIMINAL
GUILT 129 (1963).
137. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 5 intro (1982).
138. Posner, supra note 63, at 1205; see supra text accompanying note 56.
139. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 127, at 1067.
140. Posner, supra note 63, at 1205-06; Shavell, supra note 55, at 1257. It should be noted that
this social welfare analysis precedes the application of opportunity- or preference-shaping methods
and is consistant with either theory.
141. Shavell, supra note 55, at 1257. Shavell also uses a similar argument to explain the defense
of duress. Id.
142. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTr, supra note 114, at 441-43; see also MODEL PENAL CODE Official
Draft and Revised Comments § 3.02, comment 2 (1985) ("necessity must arise from an attempt by
the actor to avoid an evil or harm that is greater than the evil or harm sought to be avoided by the
law").
143. In economic terms, the necessity defense describes what is referred to as a "corner solu-
tion." The person's opportunity set is such that only one choice is feasible and the person's prefer-
ences do not enter into the decision.
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case of necessity the criminal act indicates nothing about the person's
preferences, it is not an occasion for criminal punishment to modify pref-
erences. 144 This rationale for the necessity defense also seems plausible
and, indeed, has been identified by some legal commentators. 145 It seems
that on the issue of the necessity defense, the two models happily
coalesce.
C. The Amount and Form of Criminal Punishment
Under legal theory, the amount and form of criminal punishment is
based on individual culpability.146 Judges determine an offender's culpa-
bility by assessing the offender's responsibility for the offense and the
seriousness of the crime.147 The judge then levies an appropriate punish-
ment that may consist of condemnation, fines, probation, imprisonment,
or death. Legislative guidelines aid in the determination of the appropri-
ate sentence. 148 Imprisonment is viewed as the strongest form of punish-
ment, short of death, and appropriate for only the most culpable
offenders. 149 Fines are treated as incommensurate with imprisonment
and appropriate for less culpable offenders. 150 Criminal punishment may
vary in amount and form with characteristics of the individual offender.
For example, an offender's punishment may be lighter and of a more
rehabilitative bent if he is young or has marketable skills. 51 Finally,
courts generally try to ensure that the incidence of criminal punishment
falls on the culpable individual. If a person commits a crime on behalf of
a corporation, it is generally the individual and not the corporation that
is held criminally liable. 152
144. Similar arguments explain the defenses of self-defense and duress.
145. P. BRETT, supra note 136, at 155.
146. T. HENDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 28 (1969); Flynn, Crimi-
nal Sanctions Under State and Federal Antitrust Laws, 45 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1308 (1967).
147. Flynn, supra note 146, at 1308.
148. For example, the United States Sentencing Commission has promulgated the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines pursuant to the legislative directives contained in 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (Supp. V
1987).
149. Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, supra note 59, at 483 (1980); Renfrew, The Paper Label Sentences:
An Evaluation, 86 YALE L.J. 590, 613 (1977).
150. Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, supra note 59, at 483 (1980); Renfrew, supra note 149, at 517.
151. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 114, at 28.
152. See, eg., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 15 (1988) (criminal penalties under the
Sherman Act adhere to the individual). Although rare, the prosecution of corporations for crimes
that are malum in se has sometimes been attempted. See, e.g., People v. O'Neil, 550 N.E.2d 1090
(Ill. App. 1990) (prosecution of corporation for involuntary manslaughter and reckless conduct);
State v. Ford Motor Co., 47 U.S.L.W. 2514 (Ind. Super. 1979) (indictment of corporation for negli-
gent homicide arising from alleged reckless design of Pinto upheld); People v. Warner Lambert Co.,
69 A.D.2d 265, 277, 417 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1003 (1979) (indictment of corporation for negligent homi-
cide arising from explosion at plant), rev'd, 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159, cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981). In such cases, the mental state of its offers is imputed to the corpora-
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These aspects of criminal punishment are curious from the perspec-
tive of the opportunity-shaping theory of criminal law. If criminal pun-
ishment is the "tax" or "price" levied to discourage criminal activity,
then it should make little difference whether that tax is paid in dollars or
the pain and foregone earnings of imprisonment. 153 In fact, as Becker
has argued, society should prefer fines to imprisonment in punishing
criminals, since fines are cheaper to administer.1 54 Moreover, if criminal
punishment is a tax or price that optimally should be set equal to the
social costs of the crime divided by the probability of apprehension and
conviction,1 55 the sentence for a given crime should vary only according
to the person's probability of apprehension and conviction, and her op-
portunity costs of imprisonment.1 56 On this basis, Becker has even ar-
gued that rich people should receive shorter prison terms than poor
people because of their greater wage losses during imprisonment. 157
Finally, Posner has argued that corporations, not individuals, should be
held liable for antitrust offenses since the corporation can weigh the costs
and benefits of the criminal act and fire the perpetrator if the crime's
benefits do not outweigh its costs.' 58
Under the preference-shaping theory of criminal law, criminal pun-
ishment seeks to shape people's preferences as well as their opportunities.
The technology of shaping preferences partially determines what is the
optimal amount and form of punishment. Society may not view fines and
imprisonment as equivalent for purposes of preference modification.
Moreover, the optimal amount and form of preference modification, and
therefore punishment, may vary with personal characteristics that indi-
cate more or less deviant preferences and more or less susceptibility to
different methods of preference modification. For example, it makes
tion. O'Neil, 550 N.E.2d at 1098-99 (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, S 5-4(a)(2) (1981)). Prosecution
of corporations for crimes that are malum prohibitum is much more common but follows a different
analysis. See infra note 189.
153. Becker, supra note 2, at 193.
154. Id.
155. See supra note 48.
156. Some more caveats must be added if the opportunity-shaping analysis accounts for the fact
society gives no value to criminal benefits. Under such an analysis, Shavell has argued that optimal
criminal punishment may vary with individual characteristics that indicate high benefits from the
crime. Shavell, supra note 55, at 1244. Posner has argued in a similar context that under the oppor-
tunity-shaping theory, wealthy people should be charged higher fines because of the declining mar-
ginal utility of wealth, and recidivists should be given harsher sentences because of their
demonstrated unusual individual benefits from crime. See Posner, supra note 63, at 1215-16. De-
spite these caveats, I would still argue that much of the variation in sentencing based on individual
characteristics is better explained by the preference-shaping theory of criminal law.
157. Becker, supra note 2, at 179-80.
158. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 226 (1976); Posner, Optimal
Sentences for White Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 409, 418 (1980).
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sense to use rehabilitative methods on younger criminals who are not yet
"hardened" and committed to a criminal lifestyle. 159 Indeed, under a
preference-shaping theory of the criminal law, we may want to punish
rich people more for a given crime because, given their greater legal op-
portunities, their commission of the crime indicates more deviant prefer-
ences. Finally, it makes sense under the preference-shaping theory of the
criminal law that the incidence of punishment should fall on the individ-
ual. Organizations such as corporations have no preferences independent
of their officers and agents that society can hope to modify.
III. EXPLANATION OF THE CRIMINAL CATEGORY
The very existence of the criminal category has posed a puzzle for
law and economics scholars.1 60 If externalities are subject to private ac-
tions for damages under tort law to limit their commission to efficient
levels, why are some externalities designated crimes and subject to state
prosecution for condemnation and fines or imprisonment? Several oppor-
tunity-shaping explanations of the existence of the criminal category
have been put forward.
Becker has argued that an externality is designated a crime when it
is hard to identify and catch the perpetrator of the externality. 161 Be-
cause criminals are hard to catch, not all criminals will be caught; and
the penalty imposed on them will have to exceed actual damages so that
the ex ante expected cost of the crime to the criminal equals the costs he
imposes on the rest of society.' 62 Becker argues that imprisonment is
used to punish criminals because some individuals cannot afford to pay
commensurate fines.163
Calabresi and Melamed have hypothesized that we characterize cer-
tain acts as crimes and impose criminal sanctions to prevent individuals
from undermining property and inalienability rules. 64 They argue that
society uses three kinds of rules to prevent people from harming others
through externalities: 1) property rules in which the perpetrator must
buy the right to engage in the externality from those who are adversely
159. Greenwood, Controlling the Crime Rate Through Imprisonment, in CRIME AND PUBLIC
POLICY (J. Wilson ed. 1983).
160. R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 7, at 511-14; Coleman, supra note 5, at 323; Klevorick,
Economic Theory of Crime, supra note 5, at 295; Klevorick, Torts and Crimes, supra note 5, at 907.
161. Becker, supra note 2. For example, a burglar is harder to identify and catch than a person
with a negligently icy sidewalk. Shavell offers a more sophisticated presentation of this argument.
Shavell, supra note 55, at 1238-39.
162. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
163. Becker, supra note 2, at 196; see also Shavell, supra note 55, at 1238-39.
164. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1125 (1972).
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affected; 2) liability rules in which the perpetrator is free to engage in the
externality as long as he pays what a court determines to be fair compen-
sation to those who are adversely affected; and 3) inalienability rules in
which the perpetrator is prohibited from engaging in the externality,
even if those who are adversely affected are willing to sell their right. 165
Society collectively determines whether a particular externality will be
governed by a property, liability, or inalienability rule by weighing effi-
ciency, distributional, and "other justice" considerations.1 66 If we
allowed a thief to take a watch and just pay damages, this would allow
the thief to convert a property rule into a liability rule. 167 Similarly, if we
allowed a person to steal an election through ballot fraud and merely pay
damages, this would allow the person to convert an inalienability rule
into a liability rule.168 Thus Calabresi and Melamed argue that society
imposes criminal penalties with expected values in excess of damages to
prevent individuals from converting property and inalienability rules into
liability rules, thereby undermining society's determination as to how to
best treat externalities.1 69
Klevorick has generalized and extended Calabresi and Melamed's
analysis. 170 He has termed society's chosen system of property, liability,
and inalienability rules the "transaction structure" because it "stipulates
the terms on which particular transactions or exchanges are to take place
under different circumstances." 171 Klevorick has argued that any act vi-
olating this transaction structure will be subject to criminal punish-
ment. 172 Thus, in addition to preventing the conversion of property and
inalienability rules into liability rules, the criminal law seeks to prevent
the conversion of inalienability rules into property rules.173 For example,
criminal law prohibits the buying and selling of votes. Klevorick empha-
sizes the non-efficiency considerations involved in society's determination
165. Id. at 1092-93.
166. Id. at 1093-1105. In general, society favors property rules because they allow individual
valuation of benefits and costs. Society uses liability rules when a property rule would be inefficient
because of high transaction costs or probable strategic behavior. Inalienability rules are used when a
voluntary transaction imposes significant externalities on third parties. Id. at 1105-15.
167. Thereby circumventing the owner's right to set the value of the watch. See supra note 166.
168. Thereby imposing externalities on the rest of us even if the person could have bought
enough votes to win the election for the amount he would have paid in damages. See supra note 166.
169. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 164, at 1124-27.
170. Klevorick, Economic Theory of Crime supra note 5, at 301-04.
171. Id. at 301.
172. Id. at 303.
173. Id. at 302-03. Klevorick also hypothesizes that the criminal law will prohibit the conver-
sion of liability rules into property rules. The hypothetical example he gives is that of a society
which makes a societal determination that a certain standard for pollution will be enforced by a




of the optimal transaction structure and argues that to legitimize the
transaction structure, one must look outside economics.174
Posner has taken a similar but narrower approach than that of Cala-
bresi and Melamed in explaining the existence of the criminal category.
Posner argues for the primacy of voluntary transactions over involuntary
transactions on the basis of efficiency. 175 Voluntary transactions ensure
that resources are allocated to their most valued use, given the current
distribution of wealth and preferences, whereas involuntary transactions
do not. Expected criminal penalties must exceed damages to "channel"
activities into voluntary transactions and discourage people from resort-
ing to involuntary transactions.176 Thus, in the language of Calabresi
and Melamed, Posner argues-that expected criminal penalties must ex-
ceed actual damages to prevent individuals from converting property
rules, which society prefers on the basis of efficiency, into liability
rules.1 77 Posner does not consider the distributional or other justice cri-
teria considered by Calabresi and Melamed.
Yet there are problems with all of these explanations. The fact that
not all criminals are caught has never seemed convincing as an explana-
tion of the criminal category.178 If all criminals were caught, would that
end the distinction between torts and crimes? What about the fact that
not all tortfeasors are sued? Why isn't imprisonment used for tortfeasors
who are judgment-proof? Although a better explanation, the primacy of
voluntary transactions based on efficiency considerations does not fully
explain the existence of criminal law. Criminal law is sometimes used to
frustrate efficient voluntary transactions-for example vote selling, pros-
titution, drug sales, and blackmail. 179 Calabresi and Melamed's explana-
tion, as extended by Klevorick, is not subject to the same criticism since
these aberrations from the rule of efficiency could be explained by distri-
butional or other justice considerations. However, Coleman has argued
that despite its inclusion of these non-efficiency considerations, Calabresi
and Melamed's explanation of the criminal category does not adequately
account for the moral aspect of criminal law. 180 Coleman argues that the
criminal law is more than just a pricing mechanism, and that the prohibi-
174. Id. at 303.
175. Posner, supra note 63, at 1195-96.
176. Id
177. Klevorick, Economic Theory of Crime, supra note 5, at 296.
178. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 164, at 1125; Coleman, supra note 5, at 318-19.
179. Coleman, supra note 5, at 319; Klevorick, Economic Theory of Crime, supra note 5, at 302.
180. Coleman, supra note 5, at 323, 326. Coleman also argues that a good deal of the criminal
law has nothing to do with transactions or the transfer of resources. Accordingly he objects to
Klevorick's idea that the criminal law enforces a transaction structure. Id. at 323; see also Fletcher,
supra note 6, at 924-25; Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 336-39.
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tions of the criminal law serve as guidelines for behavior apart from the
attached sanctions.1 81 Coleman complains that the requirement of in-
tent, concept of culpability, and use of imprisonment are not encom-
passed in the "inducement" theory of the criminal law.1 82
The preference-shaping theory of criminal law provides an economic
explanation of the distinction between tort and criminal law. In control-
ing externalities, society will rely first on the cheaper opportunity-shap-
ing methods of the tort law. The prosecution of torts is left to private
parties for reasons of administrative efficiency.1 83 The prospect of tort
damages simultaneously creates incentives for good behavior and pro-
vides a means to compensate the victims of externalities for their losses.
Society can use the opportunity-shaping properties of tort law to reduce
an externality to the efficient level by limiting tort damages to compensa-
tion,1 84 or to reduce the externality below the efficient level by allowing
punitive damages.18 5 Tort law will be the only legal remedy for external-
ities in which there are negative net social benefits from preference shap-
ing through the criminal law because society values the utility derived
from both sides of the incompatible preferences almost the same amount.
The more costly preference-shaping methods of the criminal law
will be reserved for externalities in which there are substantial social ben-
efits from preference shaping through criminal punishment that exceed
its higher social costs. The prosecution of crimes is conducted by the
government because this facilitates the preference-shaping process and
no single individual has sufficient interest in society's preference-shaping
policy to undertake the task.186 As previously discussed, the criminal
law's reliance on condemnation and imprisonment is also dictated by the
181. Coleman, supra note 5, at 324.
182. Id. at 325. Coleman uses the words "guilt" and "fault" rather than intent.
183. Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEG.
STUD. 1, 3 (1974).
184. R. POSNER, supra note 56, at 149. This statement assumes that all tortfeasors are caught
and successfully prosecuted. I also ignore the well-known qualifications with respect to level of
activity and risk aversity. A. POLINSKY, supra note 56, at 67-74.
185. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 79, 89 (1982). It
might also be argued that punitive damages are partially intended to shape preferences. PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 120, at 9.
186. As previously discussed, the preference-shaping process is facilitated if the party seeking to
shape preferences bears some degree of legitimate authority over the subject. See supra note 83 and
accompanying text. Hopefully, the state occupies such a position of authority in the eyes of most
people. Furthermore, society's preference-shaping policy is a public good that no individual has
sufficient interest to pursue out of her own self-interest. Even the victim of a crime does not have
sufficient interest to prosecute the criminal for preference-shaping purposes since the victim cannot
be sure she will benefit in the future from the preference shaping. However, desire for revenge may
substitute as sufficient motive for the victim to prosecute in some circumstances.
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preference-shaping technology. 187 Of course, criminal penalties shape
opportunities as well as preferences, and these social benefits should be
taken into account in setting the optimal criminal penalty. 188 However,
crime is distinguished from other externalities because society has deter-
mined that in these instances, the social benefits of preference shaping
through the criminal justice system outweigh the social costs because so-
ciety values the utility derived from only one side of the incompatible
preferences.189
This explanation of the criminal category bears some relation to the
prior efforts of law and economics scholars. Examination of Klevorick's
transaction structure reveals the underlying social norms that are the ba-
sis of the preference-shaping theory of criminal law.190 Society's decision
that certain entitlements should be transferred by voluntary exchange
with money, voluntary exchange without money, or simply not be ex-
changed, represents our social norms as to how and whether individuals
should want to exchange these entitlements. Moreover, economic justifi-
cations for the criminal category that have been put forward to date also
support the preference-shaping theory of the criminal category. The fact
that the perpetrator of an externality is costly to catch would recommend
it for the criminal category under the preference-shaping theory of crimi-
nal law. An optimal social policy will rely more on preference shaping in
cases in which incentives are costly to use. Similarly, since the protection
6f voluntary transactions promotes economic efficiency and protects indi-
187. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
189. This distinction does not apply to crimes that are merely malum prohibitum rather than
malum in se. With malum prohibitum crimes, society values the benefits the criminal derives from
the crime and attempts no preference shaping. Accordingly, the commission of such crimes carries
with it no stigma of immorality and generally results in only a fine if the defendant is willing to pay.
The activity is made a crime only because its external effects are felt by society at large, and no
individual member of society has sufficient incentive to prosecute to limit the activity to efficient
levels. Accordingly, a malum prohibitum crime is basically a non-criminal tort that is prosecuted by
the government because its external costs are dispersed among the population as a whole. For exam-
ple, parking violations are a crime, yet there is little moral stigma attached to them and even smaller
chance of punishment beyond a fine. Parking violators impose costs on society as a whole in the
form of traffic congestion, yet no individual would have sufficient incentive to prosecute parking
violators if it were merely a tort. As a result, society makes parking violations a crime and takes it
upon itself to prosecute these transgressions to limit them to the efficient level. Legal commentators,
including Blackstone, have long recognized that crimes that are merely malum prohibitum are basi-
cally torts which are prosecuted by the state, 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *54, 55, 58; R.
PERKINS & R. BoYcE, supra note 127, at 886-87.
190. I use the word "reveal" here advisedly since the transaction structure reveals the underlying
social norms in much the same way an individual's consumption decisions "reveal" his or her under-
lying preferences. For a discussion of the revealed preference theory of individual consumption, see
H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 116-20 (1987); H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 141-42 (2d ed. 1984).
[Vol. 1990:1
PREFERENCE SHAPING
vidual autonomy, it would seem there would be high social benefits in
promoting preferences for voluntary transactions.
However, the preference-shaping explanation of the criminal cate-
gory goes beyond the prior economic explanations to give an account of
the moral dimension that Coleman and others have identified as distin-
guishing criminal law from tort law. 191 Under the preference-shaping
theory, criminal punishment is not merely the price of crime, but is also
an expression of society's condemnation of the criminal act and an effort
to discourage preferences for such activity.192 In achieving these objec-
tives of criminal punishment, imprisonment has significant, although
costly, advantages over fines. A person should be subjected to criminal
punishment only if her mental state and actions evidence culpability in
the form of preferences that deviate from societal norms.193 Criminal
law is viewed as part of an overall social process of shaping peoples' pref-
erences to conform to established social norms and notions of
morality. 194
It should be noted that although the preference-shaping theory of
the criminal law provides an economic explanation of the criminal cate-
gory, it by no means provides a determinative economic answer to the
question of which activities society will designate as crimes. The afialysis
depends on the technologies of shaping opportunities and preferences
and society's determination as to whose utility from what activities
should be valued in the social welfare function. My simple treatment of
these concepts in this Article masks a myriad of important questions.
How are preferences formulated and shaped? How is the social welfare
function produced in the political process? Why are certain preferences
or values placed above others to become social norms enforced by crimi-
nal laws? These questions are traditionally the domain of other disci-
plines, including sociology, psychology, political science, philosophy,
theology, criminology, and jurisprudence. 195 Although economics can
add further insight into these questions, it would seem that economists
can be usefully informed by other disciplines on the subject of crime.
191. J. GORECKI, supra note 109, at 3-27; Coleman, supra note 5, at 323, 326; R. Epstein, supra
note 6, at 231; Fletcher, supra note 6, at 924-25; Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 753, 775-79, 967 (1943); Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 336-39.
192. Compare this view of criminal punishment with the concerns expressed in Coleman, supra
note 5, at 324-25; Fletcher, supra note 6, at 923-24; Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 337-38.
193. Compare this perspective with the concerns expressed in Coleman, supra note 5, at 325;
Epstein, supra note 6, at 243 (in criminal law the individual's conduct is measured against an "ideal
standard of judgment"); and Hall, supra note 191, at 778.
194. Gorecki views the criminal law as a means of societal moral education. J. GomEcmi, supra
note 109, at 22-27.




To address the problem of externalities, society employs both oppor-
tunity- and preference-shaping methods. The optimal social policy for
employing such methods will depend on society's valuation of the utility
derived from the realization of the various preferences of the members of
society, and the social cost technologies of shaping opportunities and
preferences. In general, shaping opportunities will be cheaper than shap-
ing preferences because shaping opportunities requires fewer resources
and involves less infringement of individual autonomy. Accordingly,
opportunity shaping will enjoy wide use by society and may be exclu-
sively employed where society values the utility derived from both sides
of incompatible preferences. However, society will also use preference-
shaping methods where the social benefits of such methods exceed their
social costs. In particular, preference-shaping methods will be used
when society values the utility derived from only one side of incompati-
ble preferences.
Criminal law can be usefully treated as a preference-shaping policy.
The preference-shaping theory of criminal law provides an explanation of
the importance of intent to criminal liability since the intentional inflic-
tion of proscribed harms indicates deviant preferences in need of modifi-
cation. The evidence of such deviant preferences by sufficient acts is the
true test of criminal liability, whether or not harm is actually visited on a
victim. Moreover, the optimal form and amount of criminal punishment
will depend on the technology of preference shaping and will vary with
individual characteristics of the criminal which indicate more or less sus-
ceptibility to different methods of preference modification and more or
less need for preference modification. Finally, the preference-shaping
theory of the criminal law provides an economic explanation of the crim-
inal category. An externality is designated as a crime when, due to a
grave dispaiity in the value society assigns to the utility derived from
each side of the incompatible preferences, the social benefits of shaping
preferences through criminal punishment exceed its social costs.
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